A policy response to the e-commerce revolution: the case of betting taxation in the UK by Paton, D et al.
 
 
 
A POLICY RESPONSE TO THE E-COMMERCE REVOLUTION: THE 
CASE OF BETTING TAXATION IN THE U.K. 
 
forthcoming in the Economic Journal, May 2002 
 
Dr. David Paton* 
Senior Lecturer in Industrial Economics 
Nottingham University Business School 
Wollaton Road-Jubilee Campus 
Nottingham NG8 1BB 
Tel: (0115) 846 6601 
Fax: (0115) 846 6667 
Email: David.Paton@Nottingham.ac.uk 
 
 
Professor Donald Siegel 
Professor of Industrial Economics 
Nottingham University Business School 
Wollaton Road-Jubilee Campus 
Nottingham NG8 1BB 
Tel: (0115) 846 6629 
Fax: (0115) 846 6667 
Email: Don.Siegel@Nottingham.ac.uk 
 
 
Professor Leighton Vaughan Williams 
Professor of Economics and Finance 
Nottingham Trent University 
Burton Street 
Nottingham NG1 4BU 
Tel: (0115) 848 5516 
Fax: (0115) 848 6829 
Email: Leighton.Vaughan-Williams@ntu.ac.uk 
 
 
*Corresponding Author 
 
 
We are grateful to numerous officials at Her Majesty's Customs and Excise and to the 
Horserace Totalisator Board for providing data and advice regarding this research.  We also 
acknowledge the helpful suggestions and comments of four anonymous referees. 
 
 
JEL Classifications: H21, H25. 
Key words: taxation, e-commerce, betting, gambling 
 
 
 
A Policy Response to the E-Commerce Revolution: 
The Case of Betting Taxation in the U.K. 
 
Abstract 
Several environmental changes in the 1990s, including the introduction of a national lottery, 
the rise of Internet gambling, and the reduction of trade barriers within the European Union, 
induced the U.K. Government to initiate a large-scale review of betting duty.  As a result of 
this review, the Government recently announced a significant reduction in betting taxes.  
They also decided to replace the current general betting duty (GBD), levied as a proportion of 
betting stakes, with a gross profits tax (GPT), based on the net revenue of bookmakers.  We 
examine the economic rationale behind these decisions and demonstrate how these tax 
changes have broad implications regarding optimal levels of taxation for other sources of 
government revenue.
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A Policy Response to the E-Commerce Revolution: The Case of Betting Taxation in the 
U.K. 
 
1. Introduction 
Excise duties, chiefly from petrol, alcohol, cigarettes and gambling, constitute approximately 
10% of U.K. Government revenue.  In recent years, actual revenues from such duties have 
been significantly less than projected revenues, due to shifts in tax and trade policies and 
technological change, which have induced substitution within and across national borders.  
One such policy initiative was the reduction in trade barriers within the European Union, 
which has exposed structural differences in excise duty rates across nations.  For example, 
excise rates on alcohol, cigarettes, and petrol are considerably higher in the U.K. than in 
some neighbouring countries.  In each of these cases, U.K. suppliers have become especially 
vulnerable to competition from lower-tax countries.  A related problem has been the growth 
of illegal imports of alcohol and cigarettes.  These threats have led consumers and industry 
representatives to demand that the U.K. Government reduce excise duties.1 
Pressure to reduce betting duty has been particularly intense, due in part to the rapid 
rise of Internet gambling.  Internet gambling allows U.K. bettors to avoid excise duty by 
placing wagers with offshore or overseas companies.  Thus, the Internet poses a threat to 
government revenue streams and to the competitiveness of the U.K. gambling industry.  The 
prevailing sentiment among U.K. policymakers and practitioners is that such threats will 
become more severe, unless tax policies are substantially modified. 
As a result of this review, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced a major 
reduction in the overall level of betting taxation in his budget statement of April 2001.  He 
also announced that ‘General Betting Duty’, levied as a proportion of betting stakes, would 
be replaced by a ‘Gross Profits Tax’ based on the net revenue of bookmakers.  The 
 
1Even so, the influence of the EU Single market on gambling is likely to be of relatively limited 
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Chancellor proposed a tax rate of 15% for fixed-odds and pari-mutuel bookmakers, 10% for 
sports spread bookmakers and 3% for financial spread bookmakers. 
Spread bookmakers operate by offering a spread around a quantifiable future event, 
which can be bought or sold by bettors, much like a ‘future’.  These companies are regulated 
as financial services, rather than bookmaking.  The rationale for the lower tax rate on spread 
bookmakers is that the cost of operating such a business is higher than for fixed-odds 
bookmakers, especially for financial spread bookmaking.  Moreover, the turnover tax, which 
existed before the change in policy, constituted a much smaller fraction of the profits of 
spread bookmakers than their fixed-odds counterparts.  Thus, a direct shift from a turnover 
tax to a single rate of GPT would be likely to cause a significant 'shock' to the profitability of 
spread betting companies. 
The decision to change from a turnover tax to a Gross Profits Tax was made 
following a consultation process involving representatives of the bookmakers and 
independent analysis undertaken by the authors and others.  Final recommendations were 
issued by officials of HM Customs and Excise to HM Treasury, following a bargaining 
process between the Government and large betting firms.  Specifically the largest firms in the 
betting industry, including the ‘Big Four’ (Ladbrokes, William Hill, Coral and the Tote), 
agreed to transfer their off-shore business back to the U.K., in conjunction with the 
implementation of the change in the level and structure of betting taxation. 
 Although revenue from gambling constitutes the smallest of the four goods subject to 
excise duties (i.e., petrol, alcohol, cigarettes and gambling), the consequences of this dramatic 
change in betting tax policy could have important implications for policy towards duties on 
petrol, alcohol and cigarettes.  Also, similar policy debates on the taxation of gambling and 
the impact of e-commerce have emerged in other OECD countries, most notably, Australia 
 
impact, since much of the movement of gambling activity has been off-shore and outside EU jurisdictions. 
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(Smith, 2000) and the U.S. (Goolsbee, 2001).2  Thus, legislators, academics, and practitioners 
in many nations will be closely monitoring the impact of this major shift in U.K. policy. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the economic rationale behind the U.K. 
Government’s response to the e-commerce revolution and assess its likely effects on tax 
revenue, the gambling industry, and consumers.  In the following section, we contrast policy 
perspectives on gambling in the U.S., U.K., and Australia.  Section 3 provides some 
background information on the U.K. betting industry and the characteristics of these markets.  
The following section describes the key environmental changes that have provided an 
impetus for the shift in tax policy.  Section 5 evaluates the proposed policy shift against 
several criteria, with a particular focus on economic efficiency.  The final section consists of 
conclusions and suggestions for additional research. 
 
2. Policy Perspectives on Gambling in the U.S., U.K., and Australia 
 
There are salient differences in policy and social perspectives on the gambling industry in the 
U.K., U.S., and Australia, which we summarise in Table 1. 
In the U.S., most of the major policy issues are resolved at the state level, since state 
legislatures have jurisdiction over most aspects of gambling.  An important secular trend in the 
U.S. is that gambling, especially in the form of lotteries and electronic gaming devices (e.g., slot 
machines), has become much more socially acceptable.  Most U.S. states now have lotteries, 
which are often used to fund politically popular education programs.3  In 1978, only one state, 
Nevada, allowed casino gambling.  By 1999, 27 states had authorised some form of casino 
gambling.  Eadington (1999) reports that gambling revenues have risen almost threefold over a 
15 year period, rising from approximately $17 billion in 1982 to approximately $51 billion in 
 
2 In the U.S. Goolsbee (2000) finds that Internet commerce is highly sensitive to changes in state sales 
taxes.  
3 See Clotfelter and Cook (1989) for trenchant analysis of the rise of lotteries in the U.S.  
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1997 (in constant dollars), with most of the increase attributed to the spread of lotteries and 
casinos.  Christiansen (1998) estimates that gambling accounts for approximately 10% of leisure 
expenditures. 
The growth in casino gambling is mainly due to the rise of Native American (Indian) 
casinos and riverboat casinos.  Indian casinos are assigned to a particular local tribe.  Under 
U.S. law, these tribes are considered sovereign nations, and thus, are not required to pay taxes 
to states.  While tribal casinos in remote, rural areas are typically quite small and unprofitable, 
those located near major metropolitan areas (e.g., New York City, Boston, Phoenix, Miami/Ft. 
Lauderdale, and Minneapolis) yield high financial returns.  Riverboats, which are subject to 
taxes, are especially popular in the Southern and Midwestern states. 
Despite the growing popularity of gambling in the U.S., there is still strong religious 
opposition to this activity in many states and almost no support for legalising gambling on 
sporting events.  For instance, only two U.S. states allow sports betting: Nevada and Oregon, 
and in Oregon, it is permitted only on a very limited basis.  Thus, there is considerable variation 
within the U.S. in gambling activity and tax rates across regions and states. 
In the U.K., gambling is relatively socially acceptable and has rarely engendered any 
strong religious opposition.  Regulation and taxation issues are resolved at the national level.  
Also, casinos are not as popular in the U.K.  Finally, a major source of revenue growth in the 
U.K. industry is the rise in gambling on sporting events, including spread betting. 
 Perhaps the most striking difference between the U.S. and U.K. lies in the nature of the 
public policy debate regarding gambling.  In the U.S., much of this debate focuses on the 
magnitude of externalities that arise with an increase in gambling.  Opponents of the 
gambling industry tend to focus on negative externalities, such as the social costs of problem 
gambling and associated criminal activity.  Some religious groups also oppose expansion of 
gambling on moral grounds.  Supporters of the industry contend that gambling can be used to 
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promote economic development and tourism in depressed areas, such as Indian reservations 
and inner-city neighbourhoods.  They also argue that legalisation of gambling can help states 
avoid tax revenue leakage to neighbouring states that allow such activity.4 
In 1996, the U.S. Congress mandated the National Gaming Impact Study Commission 
(NGISC), which recently released its final report (see http://www.ngisc.gov).  The NGISC 
report focused mainly on the social and economic implications of the rise of gambling.  It also 
contains a considerable amount of material on the pernicious influence of sports betting on the 
‘purity’ of athletics, especially at the university level.  The bottom line is that it is not likely that 
legalised sports betting will grow in the U.S. 
In the U.K., many of the issues explored in the NGISC report are virtually absent 
from the public policy debate.  Instead, the major focus appears to be on maintaining the 
viability and competitiveness of the industry.  Likely reasons for this difference are that U.K. 
firms have established a strong competitive position in this sector and there is a high level of 
social acceptability regarding gambling.  However, it is important to note that this industry does 
not operate in a vacuum.  Environmental and tax changes will have implications for the level of 
gambling activity and more importantly, for substitutes and complements.  We consider these 
factors in subsequent sections of the paper. 
It is clear, then, that there are major differences in the nature of gambling activity and 
how it is perceived and regulated in U.K. and the U.S.  While Sauer (2001) contends that cycles 
of regulation and deregulation of gambling activity in the U.S. are the result of contests between 
conflicting interest groups, such cycles are not apparent in the U.K.  An explanation for this 
difference may lie in the fact that in the U.K. policy decisions are resolved at the national level, 
where the major political parties do not appear to have any critical disagreements. 
                                            
4See Gazel (1998) for a discussion of these issues.  He concludes that casinos have generated net 
economic losses for most states. 
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An example of this non-partisan approach was the publication in July 2001 of the 
report of the Gambling Review Body, established by the U.K. Government to review the 
betting and gaming industry and to generate a set of proposed recommendations.  In this 
report, the authors endorse further de-regulation of the industry to encourage the growth of 
'betting complexes' or licensed betting offices (LBOs).  These LBOs would be permitted to 
expand the range of betting mediums they offer, notably to increase the allowed number and 
payout maximum of casino-type games of chance.  The report also proposes additional de-
regulation of casinos, including allowing the consumption of alcohol on the casino floor and 
abolishing the current 24-hour cooling-off period before permitting access to a casino.  On 
the other hand, apart from casinos, the authors recommend that betting not be permitted in 
establishments where alcohol is served or in establishments that are not licensed primarily for 
the purpose of betting.  The overall thrust of this report is to promote de-regulation of 
gambling within a regulated licensed betting environment. 
As evidenced in Table 1, Australia falls somewhere in between the U.S. and the U.K.  
Policymaking occurs at both the state and national levels.  Smith (2000) reports that in Australia, 
as in the U.S., States have become increasingly dependent on gambling taxes as a source of 
revenue.  The author also finds that the growth in gambling tax revenue in Australia is being 
fuelled by casinos and electronic gaming devices.  While gambling has traditionally been 
socially acceptable, bookmakers operate on-course only.  In contrast to the U.S. and U.K., 
Australia has experienced more rapid growth in Internet gambling.  Finally, although the 
primary focus of the public policy debate is on maintaining industry competitiveness, as in the 
U.K., there has been some consideration given to the issue of negative externalities associated 
with gambling. 
It was such concerns that led the Australian Government to impose a ban on new 
virtual casinos.  This ban was not applied to other forms of gambling, such as dog racing, 
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horse racing, or sports events.  As in the U.S., casinos and casino-type establishments are 
quite popular in Australia.  In particular, betting in cafés and so-called 'TAB' (the Australian 
‘Tote’) bars are widespread in Australia, and so-called 'pokie' machines (electronic poker or 
fruit machines) are prevalent outside of formal gambling and gaming establishments. 
 In the following section, we present background information on the U.K. betting 
industry and the characteristics of these markets. 
 
3. Characteristics of U.K. Betting Markets 
Over £8 billion was spent on betting in the U.K. in 2000, generating more than £500 million 
in General Betting Duty.  The betting industry consists of three distinct sectors: off-course 
betting at licensed outlets (the dominant venue), on-course betting (which is not subject to 
General Betting Duty), and betting by telephone (through deposit or credit accounts, or via 
debit cards).  80% of all betting turnover is generated off-course, in LBOs (Licensed Betting 
Offices), about 10% of turnover is on-course with the remainder consisting mainly of 
telephone betting.  There is also a growing market for wagering via the Internet and 
interactive betting through the television.  Betting can be further sub-divided into fixed-odds 
betting with bookmakers, pool (parimutuel) betting with the Horserace Totalisator Board (the 
Tote), ‘spread betting’ and bet brokerage. 
In fixed odds betting, wagers are settled at specific odds.  This is the major form of 
betting in the U.K.  In pool betting, winning bettors share the pool of all winning bets, net of 
fixed deductions.  Within the off-course market, pool betting plays a very small role.  In 
addition to straight win bets, there are a wide variety of other types of bets available.  These 
include ‘each way’ bets, allowing the bettor to nominate win and place (usually in the first 
three), multiple bets on cumulative outcomes, and forecast bets which involve nomination of 
the first two or three past the post in the correct order. 
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Spread betting companies operate by establishing a market for uncertain outcomes, 
such as the price of gold or the number of goals in a football match.  The market makers set a 
‘spread’ regarding a specified outcome, and clients of these companies are invited to buy at 
the top end of the spread or sell at the bottom end.  The outcome of the trade is calculated as 
the number of units by which the actual outcome differs from the level at which the trade is 
enacted.  Spread or ‘index’ trades are available on numerous financial instruments, including 
stock market indices, various types of options, and futures on government bond, currencies, 
and commodities.  Spread betting is still, however, a very small segment of the gambling 
industry, particularly in terms of the proportion of all bets placed, and the number of bettors 
involved.  For example, it is estimated that revenue from spread betting makes up little more 
than 0.2% of general betting duty (Paton, Siegel and Vaughan Williams, 2000). 
A form of betting which is even more novel than spread betting is ‘bet brokerage’ in 
which the bookmaker acts as an intermediary (for a small commission) to match up clients 
who lay and accept bets among themselves.  This constitutes a very small percentage of total 
betting turnover. 
Traditionally, this industry has been highly concentrated.  Three large bookmaking 
chains dominate the off-course fixed odds market: Ladbrokes, William Hill, and Coral.  
These three firms account for 60% of the turnover in off-course licensed betting offices. 
Along with Tote Credit, they account for 90% of the telephone betting market.  Recent efforts 
by Ladbrokes to acquire Coral suggest further consolidation is likely in this sector.  There are 
currently four companies, regulated by the Securities and Futures Authority, operating in the 
spread-betting sector:, IG Index, , Sporting Index, Spreadex, and Cantor Index.. 
Over 70% of wagers in betting offices are on horse racing.  However, according to the 
1998 Monopolies and Mergers Commission report on this industry, the share of football 
betting is increasing, especially by telephone, via the Internet, interactive TV and through 
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spread betting.  For example, in 1997, 4.3% of betting office turnover was on football 
compared to 8% of turnover by telephone (MMC, 1998, p.81).  In the spread betting market, 
the majority of turnover is on football betting.  Industry experts predict that football betting 
will also fuel the growth of Internet betting. 
The Mintel (2001) survey of adults aged 18+ found that in a period of six months 
while 68% had bet on the National Lottery, only 11% had bet on any form of sports betting in 
a betting office (although this rose significantly since 1997).  Just 8% bet on the football 
pools and 3% in a casino. 
A key trend has a precipitous decline in the amount wagered on football pools.  
Between 1993 and 1999, such turnover has dropped by about 60%.  Although the number of 
bingo clubs also fell sharply between 1993 and 1999, turnover has recently sharply 
recovered.  This could be due to additional de-regulation of this sector, which has led to more 
AWPs (Automated Win Payout ‘Slot Machines’), higher prizes, and further promotional 
opportunities. 
On-shore bookmakers are subject to payment of 6.75% on turnover, as well, at the 
present time, to an additional levy on horse racing turnover, which averages about 1.25%, but 
varies on a sliding scale linked to turnover.  These costs are typically passed on to customers 
in the form of a 9% 'tax' on stakes or deduction from payouts.  The issue of taxation of 
financial spread betting is different than taxation of sports spread betting, due to the special 
need in the financial spread betting sector to hedge bets in conventional financial markets, as 
part of the risk management procedures.  A consequence of this financially oriented wager is 
that a losing trade for a client is often also, to a lesser extent, a losing trade for the 
bookmaker.  Lastly, no duty is currently levied on ‘bet brokerage’ systems of betting. 
Quarterly data for 1986-2000 on betting turnover are presented in Figure 1.  These 
data are seasonally adjusted and an index for each series is presented.  Five key events are 
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denoted on the graph: the abolition of on-course duty at the end of March 1987, reductions in 
GBD in April 1992 and March 1996, the introduction of the National Lottery in November 
1994, and the May 1999 announcement by Victor Chandler (a major firm in this industry) 
that it was establishing operations in Gibraltar.  It is clear that from a peak in 1989, there has 
been a gradual downward trend in turnover, with the sharpest decline in the early '90s. 
In the following section, we describe changes in the environment that provided an 
impetus for changes in the U.K betting tax. 
 
4. Changes in the Industry Environment 
A major factor in the U.K. Government’s ultimate decision to reduce the betting tax was the 
rapidly changing competitive environment in this industry, due mainly to the growth of e-
commerce and the introduction of the National Lottery.  In this regard, it is helpful to 
distinguish between the Licensed Betting Office (LBO) sector and telephone/Internet betting.  
Three environmental changes have been especially important.  Two of these are relevant 
primarily to the telephone/Internet sector and the third to the whole betting industry. 
First and most obviously, there has been an increase in the incidence of Internet 
betting in recent years, with a substantial rise in the number of independent bookmakers 
offering Internet access to betting sites.  Data on recent trends in betting turnover and gross 
profits of the five largest bookmakers indicate that turnover from Internet betting was just 
0.1% of industry turnover in September 1999.  Since then, the share of industry turnover 
derived from Internet betting has increased dramatically, rising from 0.2% in February 2000 
to 0.7% in May (the last month for which data are available).  Further, the Racing Post Usage 
and Attitudes Study (June, 2000) indicates that Internet access had increased by 50% in the 
previous eighteen months (12 to 18% with access to the Internet at home or work).  This 
penetration was very much higher at the middle to upper end of the socio-economic 
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groupings.  Among Racing Post readers, 40% had access to the Internet, with a further 9% 
intending to get access.  These findings are broadly consistent with the findings of 
Datamonitor (2001), who predict that the number of online gamblers in the U.K. will expand 
rapidly as advertising proliferates and the technology becomes ubiquitous.  They estimate 
that online gambling currently generates about $700M in turnover the U.K. (July 2001), a 
figure that is expected to rise to more than $1.6B by 2005.  The authors of this report assert 
that stronger regulation will inspire greater confidence in consumers, which will fuel some of 
the growth.  They also predict that more sophisticated online offerings and improvements in 
the quality of the on-line experience will also serve to increase demand.  Similarly, the 
Henley Centre, a leading U.K. forecasting company, predicts that the share of Internet 
gambling in the market will increase from 2% in 2001 to 9% in 2005 (Paton et al, 2000), a 
trend which is likely to enhance competition in this industry. 
The key feature of the growing Internet/telephone sector is that competition is much 
more intense in this sector than in the LBO sector.  For example, start-up costs for firms are 
much lower than those associated with High Street bookmakers, whilst search costs for 
consumers are quite low, in the sense that bettors can easily shop around and find 
bookmakers offering the best odds on a particular wager. 
A second key environmental change is that several large bookmakers have established 
offshore operations, mainly in order to avoid the U.K. betting duty.  The first was Victor 
Chandler, the U.K.’s leading independent rails bookmaker, who set up a firm in Gibraltar.  
Although, Victor Chandler’s Gibraltar operation was not subject to the betting duty, the firm 
originally charged bettors a 3% ‘administration charge’ on bets.  Subsequent competition has 
forced many on-line companies to waive ‘tax’ on bets altogether, at least in the short-term.  
More recently, the largest bookmaking chains, notably Ladbrokes, William Hill and Coral, 
have also developed offshore operations. 
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Both of these environmental changes imply that U.K. telephone/Internet bookmakers 
are now competing in a global market with lower entry barriers and greater substitution 
possibilities, populated by firms who are subject to a much lower tax burden. 
 Concomitant with the rise of e-commerce has been an increase in the number and 
availability of substitutes for betting.  The most important of these is the National Lottery, 
introduced in November 1994, along with subsequent National Lottery branded games such as 
Scratchards, the Thunderball draw and the National Lottery Extra draw.  This development has 
meant that even though the LBO sector continues to be dominated by a few firms, who are 
able to exert considerable monopoly power, their influence has diminished somewhat in the 
face of increased substitution possibilities. 
 Taken together, these three trends pose a serious threat to the U.K. betting industry 
and, thus, to the tax base for betting duty.  Based on these trends, we hypothesise that the 
demand for betting will be relatively elastic with respect to changes in the tax rate. 
 Unfortunately, there is very little evidence on the elasticity of demand for betting.  
Exceptions include the work of Suits (1977, 1979) who found that the demand for horse 
racing with respect to price in the U.S. was moderately elastic (-1.59).  Paton, Siegel and 
Vaughan Williams (2001) report own-price elasticity estimates for U.K. betting that range 
from -1.19 to -2.50.5 
 A further motivation for the proposed tax reduction is its potential impact on the 
underground or shadow economy.  In this context, we refer to illegal betting activity on which 
taxes are not paid.  Schneider and Enste (2000) provide evidence of growth in the shadow 
economies of all OECD countries.  In the U.K., the authors estimate that the percentage of GDP 
represented by the shadow economy has risen from 9.6% in 1990 to 13% in 1997.  
 
5Several authors have analysed tax revenue from lotteries (e.g., Mikesell, 1994; Szakmary and 
Szakmary, 1995) or estimated the price elasticity of demand for lotteries (e.g. Gulley and Scott, 1993; Farrell 
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Unfortunately, Schneider and Enste cannot disaggregate these figures by type of activity, such 
as tobacco, alcohol, drugs, prostitution, and gambling, so we cannot determine how much 
gambling activity has actually gone underground.  More generally though, the authors attribute 
at least some of the rise in the shadow economy to increases in taxes on items such as alcohol 
and tobacco.  It is interesting to note that the same individuals or groups that smuggle alcohol 
and tobacco, i.e., organised crime, can also potentially provide gambling services.  This is 
certainly the case in the U.S. 
 The limited evidence that is available on elasticity of demand and the extent of the 
underground economy, together with the observed changes to the competitive environment 
suggest that, ceteris paribus, the proposed reduction in betting tax will lead to a large increase 
in turnover.  If the overall tax burden on betting is not reduced, we predict a continuing decline 
in the U.K. betting industry and the tax base for betting duty. 
 One factor not considered thus far is the possibility that tax changes in a given 
gambling sector will affect tax revenue in other gambling markets and in related industries. 
The magnitude of such impacts will depend on the strength of substitution across different 
types of gambling and in related industries.  There is some limited evidence on these effects 
in the U.S. and U.K.  Siegel and Anders (1999) found that an expansion of riverboat gambling 
in Missouri was associated with a decline in revenue in other businesses in the entertainment 
and amusement sector.  The same authors (Siegel and Anders, 2001) reported that an expansion 
in Indian casinos in Arizona was associated with a reduction in lottery revenues, especially for 
Lotto games.  They did not, however, find evidence of substitution between horse and dog 
racing and lotteries.  The strongest displacement effects were found for the big prize lottery 
games. 
 
and Walker, 1998; Farrell, Morgenroth and Walker, 1999; Farrell, Hartley, Lanot and Walker, 2000; Forrest, 
Gulley, and Simmons, 2000), generally reporting an elasticity that is either close to or slightly greater than unity. 
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 In the U.K., Paton, Siegel, and Vaughan Williams (2001) find significant evidence of 
substitution between betting demand and the U.K. National Lottery.  They estimate a cross 
price elasticity of Lottery turnover with respect to betting, which falls in the range of  +0.63 to 
+1.61.  This finding implies that a reduction in the betting tax will also result in lower lottery 
revenue, as some punters substitute from the Lottery to betting. 
 In the following section, we examine the welfare implications of two alternative tax 
regimes. 
 
5. Evaluating Changes to Betting Tax Policy 
The consultation document issued by HM Customs and Excise (2000) on modernising betting 
duty asserts that potential changes to betting taxation should be judged against criteria that 
include allocative efficiency, distributional efficiency, industrial competitiveness and the 
maintenance of government revenue.  We attempt in this section to provide a framework for 
evaluating the proposed changes against each of these criteria.  In our analysis, we assume for 
the sake of simplicity that incentive effects and ease of evasion will be similar under each.6 
Conventionally, the quantity of output in betting markets is specified as the number of 
unit bets placed.  Using £1 as the standard unit, the quantity of bets is equivalent to the total 
amount staked by punters.  Further, the price of each unit bet is typically measured as the 
percentage of the stake that the punter expects to be returned in winnings.  Based on this 
 
6 Another potentially important issue is the geographical incidence of the tax.  For example, central to 
US and Australian gambling policy is taxation based on the location of the bettor rather than (as in the U.K.) 
based on the location of the bookmaker.   In the U.S., out-of-State betting is prohibited, except in carefully 
defined circumstances.  In the context of the U.K., the advantage of such a 'Place of Consumption' (POC) tax, 
levied on the bet based on where it is placed is that is might discourage UK bookmakers from establishing 
operations overseas, and be less easy to avoid.  A potential disadvantage of a POC tax, however, is that it may 
encourage new bookmakers, with no Licensed Betting Office (LBO) operations, to establish solely as tele-
Internet operations, not register for the tax, and undercut the established U.K. betting sector.  Moreover, a POC 
tax on a service such as betting may discriminate against domestic purchasers of the product in a manner that 
has negative political and trade implications.  That is, it might explicitly encourage bookmakers to target 
overseas markets.  Bookmaking is a highly controversial issue in the US, and a tax structure which, in effect, 
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approach, the total revenue received by bookmakers is the amount they retain after paying out 
winnings (rather than the total amount of money received in stakes) and the so-called ‘Gross 
Profits Tax’ is, in fact, a tax on net revenue.  Thus, it follows that General Betting Duty, 
levied as the percentage of stakes, is equivalent to a commodity (or unit or specific) tax.  On 
the other hand, the Gross Profits Tax is effectively levied as a proportion of the price charged 
to betters and is equivalent to an ad valorem tax, levied as a proportion of the price charged 
to consumers. 
  Having established this, the economic analysis of the proposed policy shift in the U.K. 
reduces to a standard comparison of commodity and ad valorem taxes.  Such a topic has been 
the subject of a long-standing literature dating back at least as far as Wicksell (1896).  It is 
easy to show that under perfect competition, an ad valorem tax leads to the same price and 
quantity equilibrium and is welfare equivalent to an equal-yield commodity tax.  Figure 2 
illustrates the simple case of a linear industry demand curve and constant marginal costs.  A 
commodity tax levied at a rate of c per unit bet shifts the marginal cost curve upwards.  An ad 
valorem tax, levied at a rate of v% of the price, causes the average revenue curve faced by 
producers to swivel inwards around the intercept on the quantity axis.  In both cases, the 
equilibrium price and quantity are (P*, Q*) and tax revenue is equal to c times Q*. 
A more interesting case occurs in the presence of imperfect competition, and many 
scholars have examined the relative incidence of each type of tax on consumers and 
producers.  Several authors assess whether taxes will be ‘over-shifted’ or ‘under-shifted’ to 
consumers under a range of assumptions about market structure and interdependence of firms 
(Stern, 1987; Baker and Brechling, 1992; Delipalla and O’Connell, 2001). 
 
actively promotes the development of UK-based campaigns into the US and elsewhere may have negative 
implications for UK industry and trade.  Most importantly, a POC tax might conflict with European Union law. 
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Of more direct relevance to the current policy debate is research assessing the relative 
impacts of each type of tax.  There is a consensus in this literature that, in monopoly and 
oligopoly markets, an ad valorem tax generates a welfare-superior outcome relative to a 
commodity tax (for example, Delipalla and Keen, 1992).  Furthermore, Skeath and Trandel 
(1994) find that for any unit tax imposed on a monopoly, “there exists an ad valorem 
tax...that produces larger profit, tax revenue and consumer surplus” (p.53).  The authors also 
show that this result generalises to all symmetric Cournot-Nash oligopolies.  For the non-
symmetric case, the result holds only given certain conditions.  Specifically, an ad valorem 
tax is more likely to welfare dominate a unit tax that raises an equal amount of revenue when 
the number of firms in the market is small and when elasticity of demand in the market is 
relatively high (p. 67).  These conditions correspond directly to the situation in U.K. betting 
markets in which the LBO sector at least is dominated by very few firms and elasticity of 
demand is likely to be decreasing due to the environmental changes outlined above.  Even in 
the case where the conditions for welfare dominance are not satisfied, Skeath and Trandel 
(1994) show that consumer surplus will still be higher under an equal yield ad valorem tax. 
Figure 3 illustrates this in the context of a pure monopoly.  Tax revenue under the 
commodity tax is given by the equilibrium quantity, Q*, times c.  Under the ad valorem tax, 
revenue is given by Q* times the difference between AR and AR(v).  In order to achieve the 
same equilibrium price and quantity in each case, it is clear that (AR - AR(v)) must be greater 
than c and that revenue under the ad valorem tax is higher.  It directly follows that a revenue 
equivalent ad valorem tax will result in lower prices and higher turnover in equilibrium, than 
will a commodity tax. 
The intuition behind these theoretical results is that an ad valorem tax (such as the 
GPT) provides an incentive for firms that have some price-setting ability to follow a low-
margin/high-turnover strategy rather than the low-turnover/high-margin strategy encouraged 
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by a commodity tax (such as GBD).  A related issue is that the GPT provides more 
favourable incentives for firms to innovate and to improve their technical efficiency in that 
the resultant lower prices (due to lower costs) induce lower taxation.7 
The majority of empirical applications of such models use data on cigarette taxes.  For 
example, Delipalla and O’Donnell (2001) use data from a range of European countries to 
confirm that commodity taxes do indeed have a greater impact on prices than ad valorem 
taxes.  Given that the cigarette industry possesses many similar characteristics to betting, i.e., 
it is highly concentrated and faces a similar threat from ‘imports’ being sold at tax free prices 
(in the case of cigarettes, illegally so), this evidence is likely to be relevant to betting markets. 
In summary, the available theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that the 
proposed switch from GBD to a GPT will, at worst, have a neutral impact on allocative 
efficiency and welfare losses in the U.K. betting industry.  The greater the extent of 
monopoly power in the industry, the greater will be the efficiency benefits of a gross profit 
tax.  Despite the increased competition from the Lottery and other forms of betting, there is 
clear evidence of high margins and monopoly pricing in the larger LBO sector of the U.K. 
market (see, for example, Paton and Vaughan Williams, (2001).  Consequently, the move to 
the GPT is likely to bring significant efficiency gains in this sector. 
The telephone/Internet sector operates on much lower margins and gains from 
allocative efficiency are much less likely here.  However, a key issue facing this sector in 
particular is the threat of international competition from companies that operate off-shore and 
thus, can avoid paying duty.  In light of this, the GPT still offers a considerable advantage to 
U.K. companies operating in this competitive sector.  With a turnover tax, if margins are 
squeezed due to competition, the level of duty payable is not altered.  On the other hand, with 
a GPT, if margins are reduced, the level of duty is automatically lower.  In other words, the 
 
7 We are grateful to a referee for this point. 
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GPT provides an automatic adjustment mechanism to companies in the face of changes to the 
competitive environment.  In industry segments where competition is intense (e.g., Internet 
and telephone betting), the tax burden will be relatively light.  In sectors that are 
characterised by less intense competition (e.g., licensed betting offices), the tax burden will 
be relatively high.  If competition is so intense that any non-zero level of tax renders it 
impossible for U.K. bookmakers to survive in this sector, then the choice between GBD and a 
GPT is irrelevant.  However, given that the political situation is such that a zero tax rate for 
this sector is unrealistic in the short or medium term, the GPT still offers considerable 
advantages even to the telephone/Internet sector.  There is also reason to believe that U.K. 
bookmakers have an advantage in terms of reputation for probity that might temper price 
competition. 
The corollary of the beneficial impact of a GPT on the competitiveness of U.K. firms 
is that changes in the competitive environment will result in automatic adjustments to 
government revenue.  These adjustments will occur because tax revenue from a GPT will 
depend on the price charged, which is itself determined by the market environment.  An 
increase in competition will lead to a decrease in tax revenue.  Thus, the ad valorem type tax 
is likely to lead to a much less secure stream of government revenue than the commodity type 
tax.  In effect, the move to a GPT would shift the burden of risk away from the private sector 
and on to the Government. 
Paton, Siegel, and Vaughan Williams (2000) outline a simple model of the U.K. 
betting market, in order to estimate the impact on prices and tax revenue of a switch from 
GBD to a GPT.  Their analysis is based on a range of different assumptions regarding the 
extent of monopoly power and the magnitude of the demand elasticity with respect to tax.  
Some summary results of this model are reported in Table 2.  The model requires estimates of 
price, quantity, and the elasticity of demand for betting with respect to deductions.  During 
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1999, total U.K. betting turnover subject to GBD was £7.3 billion pounds, whilst the mean 
price for the whole industry is estimated to be close to 0.23 (23%).  The authors use ‘high’ 
and ‘low’ elasticity scenarios and simulate the rates of a GPT that would be revenue 
equivalent to the current value of the commodity tax under different assumptions regarding 
the extent of monopoly power in the industry. 
 In the case of perfect competition, equilibrium price and quantity are unchanged with 
a switch to a GPT and the revenue equivalent GPT rate is equal to 29.3% (= t/P* where t is 
the current level of GBD and P* is the current equilibrium price).  For every other 
assumption relating to the extent of monopoly power, the equilibrium price is decreased and 
quantity increased on a move to a revenue equivalent GPT regime.  In fact, there is 
considerable evidence (see Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1998) suggesting that 
bookmakers in the off-course market have significant market power.  Using the mid-point 
assumption for the monopoly power coefficient, Paton et al (2000) find the simulated revenue 
equivalent GPT rate to lie between 0.252 and 0.271.  This implies a reduction in equilibrium 
price to between 0.215 and 0.213 and an increase in betting turnover of between 17 and 
25%.8 
The proposal to introduce GPT at a rate of 15% represents a significant reduction in 
the overall burden of taxation on betting.  This implies an even lower equilibrium price and, 
consequently, a further boost to turnover.  Despite this effect, the proposed rate of duty 
almost certainly implies a significant decrease in government revenue from betting.  
 
8 Paton, Siegel, and Vaughan Williams (2001) show that this assumption implies that just over four 
pence out of each pound bet is taken as monopoly profits.  The figures used imply that a typical £1 bet in an off-
course shop would be broken down as follows: 
returned to bettor    0.77  
tax     0.0675 
levy plus costs (including a normal profit) 0.12 
monopoly profits.   0.0425 
Analysis of profit margins within the industry using published accounts data and additional information supplied 
by Customs and Excise suggests that the largest bookmakers have a profit margin about 4 percentage points 
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However, given the rapid change in technology and growth of competition, it is likely that 
maintaining the status quo would also result in a significant decrease in tax revenue.  If the 
tax reduction is successful in boosting consumer demand and in reducing the off-shore 
operations of U.K. bookmakers, government revenue may well be higher in the long run than 
under the ‘no action’ scenario. 
Another economic issue that arises from our analysis of the impact of tax changes is 
the importance of substitution.  It is reasonable to assume that a decline in the price of 
betting, arising from a switch to an ad valorem type tax and/or from a decrease in the overall 
level of taxation, will reduce the demand for substitute products.  As noted in the previous 
section, Paton, Siegel and Vaughan Williams (2001) report evidence of a high degree of 
substitution between the National Lottery and betting markets.  Thus, any decrease in betting 
taxes is likely to lead to a decrease in government revenue from the lottery (which is 
currently taxed at a rate of 12% of sales).9  A natural extension of this analysis is to examine 
substitution and revenue impacts beyond gambling.  Understanding these substitution effects 
is critical to providing an accurate estimate of the global impact on tax revenue of a reduction 
in betting duty, since several potential substitutes for gambling constitute significant sources 
of tax revenue for the U.K. government.  For example, casual observation suggests that 
tobacco consumption is prevalent at U.K. betting establishments.  Thus, it would be 
interesting to examine the impact of a change in a gambling tax on the demand for alcohol 
and tobacco. 
Another area of concern relates to distributional or equity issues associated with the 
tax policy change, i.e., whether the shift to a GPT will have an adverse affect on small firms.  
 
higher than smaller bookmakers.  If we take mean profit margins for the latter to be representative of a normal 
rate of return, this lends credence to our assumption. 
9Although total receipts from all gambling duties in the UK are significant (£1.51 billion in 1999/2000, 
for example), their share of total government revenue is less than 1% and the (direct) public finance implications 
of the change to betting duty seem minimal. 
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We consider two issues here.  The first is the possibility that larger bookmakers can exploit 
economies of scale and thus, have substantially lower costs than their smaller rivals.  The 
second is the fact that large bookmakers in the U.K. may attract a higher proportion of high 
margin business than do small bookmakers.  Specifically, it appears that large bookmakers 
derive a higher percentage of their turnover from highly profitable betting on customised 
numbers games. 
Considering the cost differential first, tax models can easily be extended to a case in 
which large firms have lower costs than small firms.  Assume that large firms set the market 
price at a level sufficient to provide them with monopoly profits.  Small firms only achieve 
normal profits and are effectively sheltering under the monopoly price set by the larger firms.  
As we have seen, the switch to a GPT is likely to lead to a lower equilibrium price relative to 
GBD.  In this case, it is conceivable that this switch would result in bankruptcy for some 
small, marginal bookmakers.  One interpretation of this exit is the failure of inefficient firms, 
in the face of increasing competition.  It is important to note, however, that increased 
concentration may have a countervailing negative impact on long-run efficiency.  Also, there 
might be important social and political considerations that make the exit of small bookmakers 
undesirable. 
The issue of whether small bookmakers attract a greater proportion of low margin 
business is less ambiguous.  As argued above, a GPT is effectively a tax on margins or prices.  
Low-priced betting products will attract a lower rate than high-priced products.  
Consequently, the shift to a GPT, other things being equal, is likely to benefit small firms 
relative to the larger firms.  For example, consider two £1 bets on alternative betting 
products.  The first product is offered by large bookmakers and returns 50 pence to the bettor 
before tax.  The second product is offered by a small bookmaker and returns 90 pence.  
Under a turnover tax of 10%, both firms will pay a tax of 10 pence and tax revenue is 20 
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pence.  The gross profits from the two bets are 60 pence, so a GPT of 33.3% would be 
required to maintain revenue.  At such a rate, the large firm would have to pay tax of 16.7 
pence and the small firm only 3.3 pence.  On balance, there seems insufficient evidence to 
support concerns that the small bookmakers will be relatively worse off under the new policy 
regime. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The U.K. Government has decided to base its betting taxation policy on economic criteria, 
such as reducing allocative inefficiency and maintaining competitiveness.  This contrasts 
significantly with the approach taken by other countries such as the U.S. and Australia, where 
an assessment of the social costs of gambling has played a much more important role in the 
consideration of policies regarding betting activity. 
The decision to reduce the overall level of betting taxation in the U.K. demonstrates 
an awareness of the fact that market conditions in the betting industry have fundamentally 
changed in recent years.  Also, the switch from General Betting Duty (GBD) to a Gross 
Profits Tax (GPT) appears to have been directly influenced by economic theory on betting 
taxation.  Specifically, the current method of levying duty on stakes is equivalent to a 
commodity tax, whilst the proposed alternative of a GPT is equivalent to an ad valorem tax.  
Assuming the existence of at least some monopoly power in the betting industry, the 
proposed switch to a GPT is likely to lead to lower prices and enhanced consumer welfare, 
compared to a situation in which GBD is retained.  The intuition behind this result is that by 
levying the tax on margins instead of turnover, producers with at least some market power 
have an incentive to reduce their price.  Further, the switch will re-enforce the proposed cut in 
the overall level of taxation in enhancing the ability of U.K. betting firms to compete in an 
increasingly competitive environment. 
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Under the new tax regime, we predict that the U.K. betting industry will be better able 
to cope with further changes in their competitive and technological environments.  The 
downside of the move to a GPT is that the revenue stream from betting taxes is likely to be 
less stable than under GBD.  In effect, the risk burden will be shifted from the private to the 
public sector.  Given the rapid pace of technological change, more intense global 
competition, and their desire to shelter firms in this industry from the deleterious effects of 
these environmental changes, however, there is a strong case that the government assume this 
additional risk. 
 The political motivation for the proposed policy changes in the U.K. arises partly 
from the fact that the betting industry has been especially vulnerable to the growth in e-
commerce.  However, given the well-publicised pressure for changes in other excise duties 
(e.g., petrol), it is crucial to note that a change in the tax regime for betting could have 
important revenue implications for other products that the government depends on even more 
as sources of tax revenue.  This is especially true for such goods as alcohol, petrol, or 
tobacco, which could constitute substitutes or complements for betting. 
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Table 1: Comparison of Gambling Public Policy Issues in the U.K., U.S., and Australia 
 
Aspect of 
Gambling 
 
U.K. 
 
U.S. 
 
Australia 
 
Level of 
Policymaking 
 
 
National Level 
 
 
Mainly State Level 
 
State and National 
Levels 
 
 
 
 
Social/Cultural 
Attitudes 
Towards 
Gambling 
 
 
 
 
 
Traditionally has 
Been Socially 
Acceptable 
 
Has Recently Become More 
Socially Acceptable; 
Strong Religious Opposition to 
Legalised Gambling in Some 
States; 
Strong Opposition to Sports 
Betting 
 
 
 
Traditionally Has 
Been Socially 
Acceptable; 
Bookmakers on 
Course Only 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Trends 
 
Growth in Internet 
Gambling; 
Growth in Sports 
Betting; 
Rise of the National 
Lottery 
 
 
 
 
 
Rapid Growth in Casinos (Indian 
Casinos and Riverboats) 
 
 
 
 
Rapid Growth in 
Internet 
Gambling 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Focus of Public 
Policy Debate 
 
 
 
Maintaining 
Industry 
Competitiveness; 
Maintaining Tax 
Revenues 
 
Emphasis on Positive/Negative 
Externalities of Gambling; 
Use of Gambling to Promote 
Economic 
Development/Tourism 
(Especially in Poor 
Communities) 
 
 
Maintaining 
Industry 
Competitiveness; 
Some Emphasis 
on Negative 
Externalities 
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Table 2: Revenue Equivalent (RE) Gross Profits Tax (GPT) Rates: High and Low Elasticity 
 
 Assumption 
Regarding 
Market 
Structure 
 
Revenue 
Equivalent 
GPT rate  
 
 
Price  
(Current) 
 
 
Price  
(GPT) 
 
 
Quantity 
(Current) 
 
 
Quantity 
(GPT) 
 
Perfect 
Competition 
 
 
 
0.293 
 
 
0.230 
 
 
0.230 
 
 
7.30 
 
 
7.30 
Monopolistic 
Competition 
 
 
0.252 
 
0.230 
 
0.215 
 
7.30 
 
9.12 
          
 
 
High 
Elasticity 
Monopoly 
 
0.248 0.230 0.213 7.30 9.32 
 
Perfect 
Competition 
 
  
 
0.293 
  
 
0.230 
 
 
0.230 
 
 
7.30 
 
 
7.30 
Monopolistic 
Competition 
 
 
0.271 
 
0.230 
 
0.213 
 
7.30 
 
8.55 
 
 
 
Low 
Elasticity 
Monopoly 
 
0.266 0.230 0.207 7.30 8.92 
 
Notes: 
(i) The high and low elasticity estimates are -1.09 and -0.67 respectively, measured with respect to total 
deductions.  
(ii) The monopoly power assumptions relates to the monopoly power coefficient discussed in Paton, Siegel and 
Vaughan Williams (2000), which ranges from 1 to 2.  Perfect competition corresponds to a coefficient of 1, 
Monopolistic Competition to a coefficient of 1.5, and Monopoly to a coefficient of 2.  This corresponds closely 
to the Lerner index of monopoly power. 
(iii) Revenue figures are in £ billion per year.  Current Quantity is total betting turnover in the U.K. for 1999 in 
billions of pounds.  Price is the average proportion of a £1 bet that is retained by the bookmaker (including 
deductions).
Fig 1: Trends in Off-Course Betting Turnover: 1986-2000 
Date
Apr 87 Apr 92 Nov 94 Mar 96 May 99
80
90
100
110
 
 
Notes 
(i) Source is HM Customs and Excise. 
(ii) The dates denoted on the graph refer to the following events: 
 April 1987: abolition of on-course duty. 
 April 1992: reduction in general betting duty. 
 November 1994: Introduction of the National Lottery 
 March 1996: Reduction in general betting duty 
 May 1999: Victor Chandler moves to Gibraltar. 
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Fig 2: Impact of Commodity and Ad Valorem Taxes under Perfect Competition 
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where  P*   = the equilibrium price under a commodity tax or an ad valorem tax. 
           Q* = the equilibrium price under a commodity tax or an ad valorem tax. 
   = tax revenue from commodity or ad valorem tax. 
 
Fig 3: Impact of Commodity and Ad Valorem Taxes under Monopoly 
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where  P*   = the equilibrium price under a commodity tax or an ad valorem tax. 
           Q* = the equilibrium price under a commodity tax or an ad valorem tax. 
 
     = tax revenue from commodity tax 
 
    = tax revenue from ad valorem tax. 
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